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A Tribute to Ann Smith
Ann Bennett Smith, a member of the law
library staff for the past nine years, passed
away of cancer on October 1, 2002, at the
age of 32. As serials associate, she was respon-
sible for the acquisition and maintenance of
serial publications and supervised loose-leaf
filing, government documents and periodical
binding. Smith was a 1992 graduate of UGA
with a degree in elementary education.
Originally from Georgetown, she lived in
Nicholson with her husband Jeff and two
cats she rescued, Morris and Bucky. She was
a member of New Hope Baptist Church,
where she taught Sunday school, sang solo
and assisted her husband in leading the
youth group.
Smith had a cheerful disposition and a wry
sense of humor, even during her fatal illness.
She made the work environment at the law
library a pleasant place for all her co-workers.
She provided quiet but valuable leadership
and insight that improved the quality and
performance of the library. In many ways,
especially in her hard work and concern for
those around her, she was the heart of her
department.  Her passing leaves a void that
will be difficult to fill.
- Jeff Satterfield, acquisitions assistant 
and Smith’s office mate
Employee Interests in
Bankruptcy: Lessons from Enron
Editor’s Note: Assistant professor Lorie Johnson
has conducted extensive research on the Enron
debacle. She currently references the Enron case
in her Bankruptcy and Corporate Finance
courses and uses the school’s new multi-media
equipment and wireless Internet network to
make the most current documents and findings
available to her students.
Enron employees lost over $1 billion in
retirement savings when the company failed
and filed for bankruptcy protection. Many
of these employees also lost their jobs.
Enron employees were both visible and
vocal about their losses, quickly obtaining
the support of both the AFL-CIO and Jesse
Jackson’s Rainbow/Push Coalition in their
fight to get some redress for their losses.
Since Enron was current on its payroll at
the time of the bankruptcy filing, employ-
ees’ losses consisted of severance payments
totaling $145 million and the losses associ-
ated with investments in Enron stock
through their 401(k) accounts.
In a typical corporate bankruptcy, the court
will appoint one committee to represent all
unsecured creditors in negotiating a reor-
ganization plan with the debtor. In the
Enron case, the court initially appointed a
15-member committee, including an
employee delegate, to represent all of Enron’s
unsecured creditors in negotiating with the
company. In a corporate bankruptcy, the
court may appoint a separate committee to
represent the shareholders in negotiating
with the debtor and unsecured creditors. The
bankruptcy code also gives the court 
discretion to appoint additional committees
if necessary to assure "adequate representa-
tion" of the parties in the bankruptcy case.
To emerge from bankruptcy as a continuing
business, the debtor has to obtain the sup-
port of any committees appointed. Courts
rarely appoint more than one creditors’
committee. Unless the bankrupt company
is solvent, the court rarely appoints a share-
holders’ committee. Enron is clearly insol-
vent and no shareholders’ committee has
been appointed. Although several groups
requested separate committees in the Enron
bankruptcy, only the employees were suc-
cessful in their request.  
A class of claimants must show they are not
"adequately represented" by the existing
committee in order to obtain separate com-
mittee representation. Factors courts con-
sider in assessing whether or not a group is
adequately represented include the size and
complexity of the case, the number and
location of the creditors, the nature of the
claims, and whether or not the claimants
are likely to be treated differently than other
creditors. The Enron employees’ claims
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“Claimants with claims of 
different priorities against a
bankrupt corporation should not
be given a separate committee
because the committee gives them
too much power to extract 
payment for their lower priority
claims by demanding better
treatment for their higher 
priority claims.”
- Lorie Johnson
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under each of these factors are substantially
similar to the other groups of trade credi-
tors requesting committees - unless the
court considers the employees’ claims based
on losses in their 401(k) accounts.
Therefore, it seems likely Enron employees
obtained separate committee representation
based on this factor.
Enron employees had a significant portion
of their 401(k) accounts invested in Enron
stock. Even though they had at least 12
other investment options, including a
money market fund, a bond fund, various
equity funds, and a self-directed Schwab
account, they had chosen to invest in
Enron stock. While some employees
undoubtedly felt pressured to make this
choice, others admittedly chose to invest in
the company’s stock because they thought it
was a good investment. They were not
alone in making that assessment. Enron
stock had significantly outperformed the
market in 1998, 1999 and 2000. As late as
a month before Enron’s bankruptcy filing,
two-thirds of the analysts following the
stock rated it as a "strong buy" or "outper-
form" the market. In fact, many pension
funds were also invested in Enron stock.
Other public employee pension funds lost
at least $3 billion in investments in Enron
stock. While Enron employees/retirees suf-
fered significant losses when Enron failed,
other employees/retirees suffered similar
losses based on the same fraudulent
accounting and
misleading
statements by
Enron’s execu-
tives.
The
Bankruptcy
Code explicitly
subordinates
securities fraud
claims. Claims
based on secu-
rities fraud are
not entitled to
payment until
all unsecured
creditors are paid, unless the unsecured
creditors agree to different treatment. This
is where separate committee representation
becomes significant. Claimants with a rep-
resentative at the bargaining table do better
than those who are unrepresented. One
study of corporate reorganizations found
that no reorganization plan was confirmed
over active committee opposition.
Consequently, having a separate committee
gives Enron’s employees substantial negoti-
ating leverage with both the company and
its other creditors. Other investors in
Enron’s stock have no voice in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. They are not creditors,
so they are not entitled to representation on
the unsecured creditors’ committee. Since
Enron is insolvent, they have no separate
committee of their own. 
Outside investors’ securities fraud claims
against Enron are clearly subordinated and
last in line for payment. Enron employees,
however, are arguing Enron’s 401(k) admin-
istrators breached their fiduciary duty in
continuing to offer Enron stock as an
investment option and company officers
breached their fiduciary duties by making
false statements and failing to disclose the
true condition of the company. This is an
attempt to transform claims that would have
securities fraud status in the hands of an
Enron outsider into claims with unsecured
creditor status in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing. This moves Enron retirees/employees,
who chose to invest in Enron stock, ahead
of other employees/retirees who similarly
chose to invest in Enron stock. 
Rather than litigating the breach of fiduci-
ary duty claims, Enron and its creditors
may choose to settle and pay the claims
through Enron’s reorganization plan. If the
employees had one vote on a 15-member
committee, as was the case initially, employ-
ees would not have much bargaining power
to extract a higher payment for their claims.
But because they have a separate commit-
tee, they have greater bargaining power.
Indeed, the fact the committee has already
been successful in obtaining severance pay-
ments of $13,500 per employee reflects its
substantial bargaining position. Since the
legal basis for treating severance pay as an
administrative expense entitled to immedi-
ate payment was extremely doubtful, this
$13,500 reflects an early payment of an
unsecured claim at a higher rate than most
other unsecured creditors are likely to
receive. Through their committee, Enron
employees may also be successful in negoti-
ating a settlement for losses in their 401(k)
accounts, even though other investors who
suffered similar losses will not recover any-
thing from the company.
Enron employees had two types of claims
against the company - claims based on sev-
erance pay entitled to higher priority and
claims based on 401(k) stockholdings with
lower priority. Claimants with claims of dif-
ferent priorities against a bankrupt corpora-
tion should not be given a separate com-
mittee because the committee gives them
too much power to extract payment for
their lower priority claims by demanding
better treatment for their higher priority
claims. While courts and trustees have
broad discretion to appoint additional com-
mittees under the bankruptcy code, they
should decline to exercise this discretion
when the group requesting the committee
has multiple claims with differing priorities
against the debtor.
-Assistant Professor Lorie Johnson
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